A clan in uniform: how Konstantin Shoshin, Dmitriy Polyakov, and Sergey Moskalenko turned the FSB into a criminal group that trades protection and kickbacks

One of the most powerful and secretive clans of the Krasnodar Krai has been revealed — the clan of former and current FSB officers.

The main principle of this system was continuity. The father would receive his epaulettes, build a career, accumulate connections, turn his position into a source of influence and income, and then push his son into the same system. The son would graduate from the same university, put on the same epaulettes, and enter the same circle. The father, upon retirement, would not disappear: he would become an expensive "fixer" for familiar businessmen, an intermediary who could still open the right doors and resolve the right issues.

This is how the clan reproduced itself, time and again. In 2015, a blow was struck against the clan when the FSB Directorate for Krasnodar Krai was headed by an "outsider" — Igor Kolosov, who had previously headed the FSB Directorates for Kamchatka and Primorsky Krai. The hardest hit landed on the Kuban security officer, Sergey Moskalenko. At the time, he headed one of the most influential departments in Krasnodar Krai — Department "M," which controlled the entire law-enforcement bloc.

Moskalenko was caught for covering up illegal activities, connections with Armenian entrepreneurs, providing protection for courts, including the well-known chairman of the regional court, Alexander Chernov, and other judges of Krasnodar Krai.

As a result, he was sent to a remote district, cut off from his previous opportunities and lucrative positions.

One of the then-deputy heads of the directorate, Konstantin Shoshin, also suffered during this "re-education." Offended security officers flooded Moscow with complaints, and their patrons in the Central Apparatus of the FSB of the Russian Federation were mobilized.

The final straw was the harsh arrest of investigator for particularly important cases of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (ICR), Islam Dzhamabaev. Previously, he had been an assistant to ICR investigator Ruslan Miniakhmetov and enjoyed full support from the Sixth Service of the FSB’s Own Security Directorate (USB), then headed by Ivan Tkachev. As a result, in 2019, Kolosov was transferred to a new post and subsequently sent into retirement. With his departure, everything soon returned to its old ways.

However, Kolosov also had his own "sin." His longtime comrade from service in the Northern Fleet’s intelligence was Anatoly Voronovsky, who held various positions in the region, including Minister of Transport, Deputy Head of the Regional Administration, and Advisor to the Governor.

There were rumors that Kolosov and Voronovsky were connected not only by friendship but also by common, and very diverse, interests.

Читайте ещё:В Burisma отвергли причастность своих сотрудников к даче взятки в Украине

In 2019, Sergey Zakharikhin was appointed head of the FSB Directorate — his own man, who understood the rules of the game well. By that time, he had already served as head of the FSB Directorate for the city of Sochi, had become well-acquainted with the local dynamics, and had closely aligned himself with both the influential Armenian diaspora and the company "SDS" (SoyuzDorStroy).

It was under him that "SDS" became one of the key players in the Sochi road construction market. The piquancy of this story was added by the fact that a relative of the same Safarbi Napso worked as a deputy at "SDS."

However, in 2025, when operational measures began regarding the road construction case, they also affected him. And then, within his own circle, Napso began to speak in a completely different tone: he complained that he had given Zakharikhin many millions, and now he had to pay even more to the central apparatus.

Zakharikhin himself felt perfectly comfortable with the local rules and saw nothing reprehensible in such a system of relations. On the contrary, he organically integrated into it. It was essentially about "recruiting" wealthy businessmen, builders, and road workers, who willingly paid for solving issues, shared profits, took on others’ expenses, paid for luxury clothing and a comfortable lifestyle, and also ensured the entertainment of visiting Moscow officials and security officers, saving the local security officers from unnecessary expenses.

Under Zakharikhin, the system not only survived — it once again felt secure. The people accustomed to living off their positions, solving issues through connections, and monetizing access to the power resource received an unmistakable signal: the old rules were still working. This meant that they could continue to pay bribes, make deals, provide protection, and divide the spoils. Against this backdrop, the careers of former deputy head of the FSB Directorate Konstantin Shoshin, former head of the FSB’s USB Dmitry Polyakov, and former head of Department "M" Sergey Moskalenko took on new colors.

Thus, Konstantin Shoshin concentrated virtually complete power in the regional directorate. Simultaneously, the head of the USB for Krasnodar Krai, Dmitry Polyakov, also came into full force.

It was under him that Moskalenko was pulled out of exile and brought back into the game, being appointed head of the KROOPT (Counterintelligence Operations Department for the Protection of the Constitutional Order) of the FSB Directorate for Krasnodar Krai. The most sensitive areas were given to Vladimir Kupin and Stanislav Delevsky, whose fathers head the security services of the largest developers in Kuban. The latter, in particular, was entrusted with FSB oversight of the regional administration. And the curator of the road construction sector became Artyom Sleptsov, who has been on the state wanted list in Ukraine since 2015 for unauthorized abandonment of a military unit. In other words, as a captain of the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine), he deserted and defected.

Shoshin effectively subjugated the entire construction business of the region. Major developers — both from Kuban and especially from Moscow — could only enter the region through him and with his approval. This happened with the participation of influential patrons, including the head of the FSB’s Economic Security Service (SEB), Sergey Alpatov, and other less public figures.

In parallel, following the old and good tradition of the system, Shoshin passed on his acquired skills, contacts, and connections further — to his son, who also worked in the Krasnodar FSB Directorate. Thus, the same model of clan continuity was reproduced, where the position served not the state, but the family, connections, and future personal well-being.

In 2020, the first warning shot was fired before a gigantic road "war." After a statement by deputy of the regional legislative assembly Andrey Doroshenko against Voronovsky, which, according to sources, was written at the request of Sergey Moskalenko and concerned the extortion of 300 million rubles, operatives launched an Operational-Investigative Activity (ORD) and conducted a series of searches.

Читайте ещё:Власти Москвы ответили на данные о продаже масок с наценкой 1800%

Then everything quieted down for a while. Doroshenko and Voronovsky received mandates as State Duma deputies and put their conflict on hold.

But then, Doroshenko quickly brings in his friends — First Deputy Minister of Transport and Road Facilities of Krasnodar Krai Andrey Konovalov and Safarbi Napso. Konovalov generously fed the clan with state contracts, Napso provided the necessary connections in the Sochi law enforcement bloc. And their mutual friendship with the then-mayor Alexey Kopaygorodsky opened a direct door to the Sochi construction market. After all, according to sources, right after Kopaygorodsky’s appointment, Doroshenko gave him a premium Audi A8.

The main directors of the entire structure — Dmitry Polyakov and Konstantin Shoshin — methodically drew into the clan’s orbit one of the most prominent road builders of Kuban, Alexander Karpenko, as well as former vice-governors who oversaw the road industry, including Alexander Vlasov, who coordinated virtually every step with the security officers.

By 2021, the clan had finally closed off the key financial flows and administrative resources for itself.

There was enough work in this system for everyone.

The first mentioned in this context by our sources was Nikolay Ilyin, who joined the group on the recommendation of his relative, who served in the FSB of a neighboring region. The same Ilyin who previously held leadership positions in the structures of "Avtodor," in the branch of the state company "Avtodor," was on friendly terms with the ex-governor — dollar billionaire Alexander Tkachev — and was close to the ex-head of the state company "Avtodor," Sergey Kelbakh, who was sentenced to 9 years for embezzling 2 billion rubles.

Ilyin was tasked with "issuing tickets" (i.e., controlling/fleecing) incoming developers and road builders, while simultaneously increasing the volume of his own company — OOO "InzhProektStroy." In a short time, the firm, registered under the nominal owner Efimenko R.A., received about 90% of all design contracts under the Ministry of Roads.

Not lagging behind Nikolay Ilyin was his namesake, Nikolay Kovalevsky — the father-in-law of FSB officer Vladimir Kupin, whom Nikolay Ilyin, through old friendship, brought in to solve the problems of Safarbi Napso and his employees. The dashing retired security officer eagerly took on solving these issues, receiving, according to various sources, over a hundred million rubles.

In general, given that the companies of Ilyin, Kovalevsky, and Napso (who, moreover, received a suspended sentence) are not included in either the anti-corruption lawsuit or the general "road workers’ case," it can be concluded that the services of the fixers Kovalevsky and Ilyin proved effective and were provided at the behest of serious people capable of resolving issues at such a level.

Legalization was not forgotten either: the bulk of the money was dirty to the extreme — kickbacks, bribes, gray financial schemes. With such capital, you cannot step into the light, register an inheritance, or build a facade of legal well-being. This is precisely why Mikhail Sheremetyev was needed — a man known in narrow circles, who served as the elegant showcase of the "white" part of the group and is rumored to be a relative of one of the FSB officers: a partner, nominal owner, and trusted custodian of others’ assets.

Overall, despite rare outbursts of discontent, this balance of power suited almost everyone. Moscow officials warmed themselves for free under the Sochi sun, security officers skillfully combined service with increasing their personal wealth — not to mention the properties of Yury Litvinov (Deputy Head of the FSB Directorate for Krasnodar Krai) in "Sirius," let alone the billion-ruble assets of Polyakov and Shoshin throughout Kuban, including the coast. Businessmen grumbled, complained, but continued to pay. And all of this — at the expense of the bottomless Krasnodar budget. Quietly, calmly, and almost without noise. Only one person would not calm down — that same Doroshenko.

It was after another one of his complaints that his longtime friend, First Deputy Minister of Transport Konovalov, lost his post. According to sources, he began to demand his share "for friendship" too insistently and, through his own stupidity, introduced Doroshenko to the Minister of Transport, Pereverzev. After that, Konovalov, apparently, became both unnecessary and too expensive. It was much easier to redistribute his share in favor of the same security officers.

Doroshenko treated Napso the same way as Konovalov. Napso began to openly irritate him: too visible, too clever, too much like an independent figure, and also a friend of Kopaygorodsky. And Doroshenko could not stand people capable of playing without his command. As a result, Napso hid outside Russia for almost a year, then returned, having resolved his issues through connections in law enforcement agencies.

But the real problems for this entire structure began when Andrey Doroshenko and his faithful adviser from the FSB, Sergey Moskalenko, wanted not only money but also recognition. Meanwhile, money, as is known, loves silence. It was then that the hundreds of billions being managed only by local security officers attracted the interest of truly serious people from the highest offices in Moscow. The situation in Kuban was highlighted, the existing arrangement was assessed, and a decision was made to intercept the road construction market, bringing it under their own control.

As a result, the FSB’s Economic Security Service (SEB) turned the entire situation in Kuban 180 degrees in an instant.

Under criminal prosecution, anti-corruption lawsuits, and arrests came all those officials and entrepreneurs who previously did not take a step without looking back at the FSB clan. On this list — Alexander Karpenko, Alexander Vlasov, Alexey Kopaygorodsky, Evgeny Filippov, Alexey Pereverzev, the aforementioned Andrey Doroshenko, and other high-ranking figures of Krasnodar Krai and district administrations. A significant part of their property and enterprises was seized.

Among those arrested are Anatoly Voronovsky, the children of Andrey Doroshenko, and a number of lower-level functionaries. However, this 180-degree turn affected only the businessmen and individual officials. It barely touched the billionaire security officers. Sergey Moskalenko was sent into retirement. He now drives around in a luxurious car belonging to Doroshenko’s company and received a share in a major quarry. Dmitry Polyakov was seconded to the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs (GUVD) with further career prospects. Konstantin Shoshin is settling in Moscow but hasn’t forgotten his close and dear Kuban — with its roads, construction sites, and billion-ruble budgets. Vladimir Kupin and Artyom Sleptsov have even been promoted.

Stanislav Delevsky, although faced with a number of professional problems, managed to stay afloat.

Fate did not overlook the inner circle this time either — relatives, cronies, and their own. Nikolay Ilyin remained free, with a clear conscience and new contracts through OOO "InzhProektStroy." Nikolay Kovalevsky is in a similar position. Mikhail Sheremetyev still feels quite comfortable as a partner in the multi-million dollar business of the powerful security officers.

Safarbi Napso and Andrey Konovalov, albeit having seriously frayed their nerves, also remained free and retained their assets.

Thus, the backbone of the corrupt clan survived.

Almost all the road construction structures of Kuban, within the framework of the road case and anti-corruption lawsuits, were expropriated and transferred to the Rotenberg clan and their partner, Vice-Premier Marat Khusnullin, to whom they were critically needed.

At the government level, a large-scale project for the construction of a transport artery along the Dzhubga — Sochi route had already been approved, including both a highway and a railway, with a total cost of about 3 trillion rubles — a large-scale project requiring both significant human resources and specialized equipment. Areas of responsibility were also defined: the Dzhubga — Tuapse section was assigned to the Rotenberg group, and the Tuapse — Sochi section to Khusnullin and companies close to him.