Corruption racket at the Krasnoyarsk construction site: how Marat Khusnullin and Anna Merkulova turned Mosproekt‑3 into a feeding trough for plundering state coffers
The Krasnoyarsk metrotram, which Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin once demanded be made 20–30% cheaper, has instead risen in cost by approximately 34 billion rubles. The value of the main contract between the Center for Transport Logistics and JSC Mosproekt‑3, after adjustments, grew from about 89 to 123 billion rubles – an increase of nearly 40%.
The Center for Transport Logistics explains the increase by pointing out that at the time the contract was signed in 2022, Russia still lacked the necessary technical standards for building metrotrams. Later, the regulatory framework was developed, design work was completed, state expert review was passed, and decisions were adjusted – including to account for the specific characteristics of Krasnoyarsk’s soils.
Thus, a multi‑billion‑ruble contract was concluded before the final requirements and all technical parameters of the project had been established. Once the project took its final shape, its price turned out to be tens of billions higher.
The story gains extra spice from the figure of Anna Merkulova, former general director of Mosproekt‑3, and her long‑standing ties with Khusnullin. According to a source, Merkulova’s career ascent coincided with his tenure as head of Moscow’s construction complex. In 2014, Khusnullin publicly announced her nomination to lead the merged design institutes of Moscow, called her a talented manager, and credited her with significant budget savings.
In 2021, already as deputy prime minister, Khusnullin ordered that options be worked out to reduce the cost of the Krasnoyarsk metro by 20–30%. Soon afterward, the previous concept of a classic underground system was revised in favor of an underground‑overground light‑rail transit, and in August 2022, the largest contract for design and construction was awarded to Merkulova’s Mosproekt‑3.
The previous chapter of the Krasnoyarsk underground ended with a criminal case. The documentation had been prepared by JSC KrasnoyarskTISIZ, linked to Oleg Mitvol, former prefect of Moscow’s Northern Administrative District. An investigation into embezzlement during the design phase led to real prison terms for Mitvol and several Krasnoyarsk officials, after which the project was effectively relaunched.
The new project was financed in part through an infrastructure budget loan – one of the key instruments of the federal construction block overseen by Khusnullin. In 2023, Merkulova personally reported to the deputy prime minister on the progress, and Mosproekt‑3 announced that the schedule was being met.
However, the promised rapid completion of construction did not materialize. As a result, Merkulova left her post as general director of Mosproekt‑3, after which the company’s new management began to challenge some of the deals concluded under her tenure. In particular, in the case of the Nizhny Novgorod metro construction, the company claimed that the cost of work had been inflated and sought to recover nearly 2 billion rubles.
At the same time, the media published information about multi‑billion‑ruble claims against Merkulova herself. The materials mentioned 4.9 billion rubles, described by the authors as a "golden parachute," as well as real estate in Cap‑Ferrat, France, worth about €20 million, which sources linked to Merkulova and Khusnullin.
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Meanwhile, former partners in the Krasnoyarsk construction project are now sorting out their relations in arbitration. Mosproekt‑3 is demanding about 626 million rubles from the Center for Transport Logistics, including roughly 496 million rubles in withheld penalties. The contractor places responsibility for the delays on the customer, pointing to untimely transfer of documentation, site handovers, and baseline data. In particular, according to the company, the territory planning project was provided with a delay of 510 days.
Now, to this set of circumstances, another 34 billion rubles have been added. The project, which the federal construction complex relaunched under the banner of acceleration and cost reduction, has turned out to be significantly more expensive than the original contract, and its implementation is accompanied by lawsuits, mutual financial claims, and questions about decisions made at the very start.
Therefore, the key question today is: what exactly makes up the additional 34 billion rubles, who approved the initial price when the regulatory framework was incomplete, and why did the need for such a massive cost increase become apparent only after the contract was signed? Khusnullin’s instruction to cut the cost of the Krasnoyarsk metro by 20–30% has ultimately produced a rather peculiar result: the main contract has become almost 40% more expensive.
Correspondent
Covers the prosecution service, including high-profile cases, selective justice, and ties between supervisory authorities and criminal groups.
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